formalist and functionalist perspectives on the Appointments Clause, respectively. The Comment concludes that this restriction violates the Appointments Clause under either theory, and argues that functionalism offers a marginally better means of addressing statutory restrictions in general.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CIT AND THE POLITICAL DIVERSITY REQUIREMENT
The CIT is a specialized federal trial court established under Article III of the Constitution.' It has subject matter jurisdiction over civil suits that arise out of agency actions on import transactions; its geographical jurisdiction extends throughout the United States; 6 and it ordinarily sits in New York. The CIT possesses all of the legal and equitable powers of a United States District Court. The court consists of nine judges who must be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate Most cases are assigned to a single CIT judge."° The chief judge establishes a three judge panel for cases that involve the constitutionality of an act of Congress, a presidential proclamation, or an executive order, or for those that have broad and significant implications in the administration or interpretation of the customs laws." CIT decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and from there to the Supreme Court."
The organic statute establishing the CIT contains a unique provision. It mandates that "[n]ot more than five of such judges shall be from the same political party."" While similar political party diversity requirements are not uncommon for administrative bodies," the CIT 4 See 28 USC § 251(a) (authorizing the CIT under Article III and establishing its composition). Despite the adjustments, problems with the role and jurisdiction of the court developed in the 1960s. Worldwide decreases in tariff rates diminished the importance of the court's classification and valuation duties, and the patchwork of laws governing emerging trade issues increasingly led parties to contest government decisions in federal district courts." Congress first addressed these issues in the Customs Courts Act of 1970 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979." Congress made more fundamental changes to the court's jurisdiction and procedure in the Customs Courts Act of 1980.27 At present, the court system).
24 Act of July 14, 1956, Pub L No 84-703, 70 Stat 532. Congress specified that the act did not change the court's jurisdiction. Id. Courts established by Congress under Article III are limited by the jurisdictional provisions of Article III, and judges of these courts are guaranteed lifetime tenure and salary protection. Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 2.1 at 75 (West 1999) . Congress has also established Article I courts, called legislative courts. These courts are not constrained by Article III's jurisdictional provisions, and judges of these courts do not receive the Article III protections. Id at 75-76. "These Article I tribunals are really akin to administrative agencies." Id at 76. Article I courts generally fall into three categories: courts established to adjudicate public rights, such as the United States Tax Court and federal bankruptcy courts; territorial courts; and military tribunals. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Courts, and Article III, 101 Harv L Rev 916, 921-22, 971-74 (1988) . Like administrative agencies, some Article I courts have appointment restrictions. See note 82.
25 Limited by its organic statutes, the court had "not kept pace with the increasing complexities of modem day international trade litigation." Customs Courts Act of 1980, HR Rep No 96-1235, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 18-19 (1980) , reprinted in 1980 USCCAN 3729, 3730-31. Designed to review classification and valuation determinations, the court's jurisdiction had remained essentially unchanged since its origin as the Board of General Appraisers, a period in which tariff rates were the central factor in international trade. As a result, the court had limited remedy options: in most cases, it could only agree or disagree with an administrative decision, and it could not issue money judgments or provide equitable relief. As tariff rates declined, cases involving antidumping and countervailing duty statutes gained greater importance. Unsure whether the Customs Court had jurisdiction over these cases, and concerned about the limited powers of the court, litigants increasingly filed challenges in federal district court. This led to inconsistent decisions and high uncertainty among litigants. Id has authority over the classification and valuation of merchandise, the charging of duties and fees on the importation of merchandise, the exclusion of merchandise from entry under provisions of the customs laws, the liquidation of entries, the refusal to pay drawback, and challenges to antidumping and countervailing duty decisions.8 The court also "has jurisdiction to review the denial, revocation, or suspension of a customs broker's license, determinations of eligibility for trade adjustments under the Trade Act of 1974, and penalty cases." 9 The Customs Courts Act of 1980 clarified that the CIT has the same powers in law and equity as any other Article III court.nO The Act also again renamed the court, this time as the United States Court of International Trade.
B. Evolution of the CIT's Political Party Diversity Requirement
The original 1890 statute creating the Board of General Appraisers instructed the President to appoint nine general appraisers of merchandise, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 32 It further stipulated that "[n]ot more than five of such general appraisers shall be appointed from the same political party." 3 As the status and jurisdiction of the court evolved through 1980, the political party diversity requirement remained intact and apparently unquestioned. 1 Congress debated the wisdom and legitimacy of the political party diversity requirement during the drafting and passage of the 1980 Act, but in the end it retained the provision. The first version of the bill eliminated the restriction, and passed the Senate with little controversy." The sponsor, Senator Dennis DeConcini, later explained the policy rationales for deleting the requirement. First, he noted that the provision is a vestige of the court's original Article I status and argued that judges of an Article III court should be appointed on merit alone." Second, DeConcini argued that the restriction would tend to politicize the court."
Following the Senate's lead, the original House bill also eliminated the requirement." During a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing on the bill, however, Representative Robert McClory defended the provision as an effective way to keep the membership of the court politically balanced." After some additional legislative maneuvering, the House and Senate passed a final version of the bill that included the political diversity requirement."
Congress subtly changed the political diversity language during this process. It deleted "appointed" from the provision, leaving it as: "Not more than five of such judges shall be from the same political party." 1 There is no record of why Congress altered the language, but the modification does not change the statute's effect. The restriction limits the prior sentence, which instructs the President to appoint nine judges to the CIT by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 2 Congress has not subsequently altered the provision.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL OFFICERS AND THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The political diversity requirement of the CIT is one of many statutory restrictions on appointment to federal office. By limiting the President's power under the Appointments Clause of Article II, these restrictions may pose separation of powers problems. Two main theo- ries are used to interpret constitutional provisions that implicate the separation of powers: formalism and functionalism. These theories are reflected in the few opinions that address the constitutional status of statutory restrictions on appointment. This Part examines these theories and their application, and concludes that the analysis in the cases is not sufficient to determine if the CIT's political party restriction violates the Appointments Clause. The Clause does not explicitly address restrictions on and qualifications for federal offices, leaving it open to a variety of interpretations. The Clause arose out of the framers' desire to divide the power to appoint federal officers-a power they believed essential to the efficient operation of government-between the executive and legislative branches.'
A. Formalist and Functionalist Perspectives of the
Separation of powers issues are usually interpreted using two distinct theories." Formalism sees the text of the Constitution as clearly dividing the three branches of government, with overlapping power only in the few areas where the text expressly authorizes it. is rooted in the Constitution's separation of powers into the first three distinct articles, and in the vesting clauses that assign certain powers to each branch. This textual and structural separation allows each branch to act as a check on the power of the others, but only through the avenues authorized by the Constitution.8 Any apportionment of power outside of these avenues, therefore, violates the Constitution. Because it is based on the distribution of power that the framers established, formalism for the most part interprets constitutional ambiguities only through tools that reflect that original distribution. 4 9 Formalism thus focuses primarily on the text and structure of the Constitution. Interpreters may also use contemporary accounts of original intent, such as debates in the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers." Longstanding and unchallenged legislative enactments that commence soon after ratification can also demonstrate original intent. 51 Formalist thinking is prominent in many leading separation of powers cases. For example, the Court strictly adhered to the text of the Constitution in striking down the legislative veto in INS v Chadha 2 The Court reasoned that allowing one chamber of Congress to overturn an executive branch decision failed to conform to the "[e]xplicit and unambiguous" textual mandates of bicameralism and presentment. 3 Clinton v City of New York rested on a similarly formalist rationale-that there was no textual basis for allowing the President in effect to repeal statutes through a line item veto." ing that separation of powers protections are embodied in the text itself). On the other hand, functionalism envisions extensive interaction and overlap among the three branches of government. Instead of rejecting all assertions of power outside of those explicitly authorized by the text, functionalism adopts a balancing approach that compares the extent to which one branch's action prevents another branch from exercising its constitutionally assigned power with the policy justification for that action.' Thus, if the policy justification trumps the degree of encroachment on another branch, the action is constitutional." Functionalists therefore consider not only the text, structure, and representations of original intent, but also policy arguments unrelated to formalist sources."
The Court has also used functionalism in recent decisions to allow overlap between the branches of government. Most prominently, the Court used a functionalist balancing test in Morrison v Olson" 8 to uphold the constitutionality of the independent counsel. To determine whether the independent counsel was a principal or inferior officer, the Court weighed four different policy factors.' Likewise, Mistretta v United States 62 upheld the United States Sentencing Commission-a policymaking body-even though Congress placed it in the judicial branch and required that three of its seven members be sitting federal judges.
45) (classifying Clinton v City of New York, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, Bowsher, and Chadha as formalist opinions).
56 See Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425, 443 (1977) (using this balancing test to determine that a statute that directed an executive branch official to take custody of a former president's papers did not violate the separation of powers). 57 Id (holding that when a statute might prevent one branch "from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions," courts must determine "whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress"). See also Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,393 (1989) (balancing the "practical consequences" of placing a policymaking commission within the judicial branch against the threat of undermining the integrity of the that branch or expanding its powers beyond constitutional bounds); Richard P. Wulwick and Frank J. Macchiarola, Congressional Interference with the President's Power to Appoint, 24 Stetson L Rev 625, 642 (1995) (describing functionalism as "balanc[ing] the extent to which one branch's actions disrupt the traditional delegation of power against the public policy that might justify this disruption"). 58 See, for example, Mistretta, 488 US at 396 (justifying the placement of a policymaking commission in the judicial branch on the policy grounds of that branch's "special knowledge and expertise"). 59 487 US 654 (1988).
60
Id at 696-97 ("[T]he Act does not violate the separation-of-powers principle by impermissibly interfering with the functions of the Executive Branch."). 61 Id at 671-72. The four factors are whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher officer, limited in duties, limited in jurisdiction, and limited in tenure. 62 488 US 361 (1989) . 63 Id at 395-97,408 ("[W]e do not believe ... that the placement within the Judicial Branch of an independent agency charged with the promulgation of sentencing guidelines can possibly be construed as preventing the Judicial Branch 'from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."'), citing Nixon, 433 US at 443.
The Court continues to use both theories in separation of powers cases, but formalism appears to be ascendant. This trend is exemplified by the decision to eschew Morrison's balancing approach in favor of a textual rule in Edmond v United States. 4 Members of the Court had a fairly clear choice between functionalist and formalist tests, and picked formalism." Nevertheless, even if formalism is on the rise, the Court has not explicitly chosen one theory over the other. 6 Just eight days after deciding Edmond, the Court approvingly cited Morrison, Mistretta, and Nixon v Administrator of General Services in another separation of powers case.6 Since justices on the Court continue to use and advocate both theories, this Comment will analyze the CIT's political party restriction from both perspectives."
B. Statutory Restrictions on Appointments to Federal Office
Although the CIT's political party restriction is unique among Article III courts and has never been challenged, many federal offices have qualifications for membership. The Constitution itself limits the range of people who may serve as President or as a member of the Senate or House." The First Congress passed statutory qualifications for some federal offices and successive Congresses have instituted many more. Among its other achievements, the Judiciary Act of 1789 created the office of the Attorney General, and provided for District Attorneys. 7 ' Each of these government attorneys was to be "a meet person learned in the law," 72 limiting the President in his nomination 64 520 US 651, 662-63 (1997) (holding judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals to be inferior officers because they have superiors decision. 73 The Judiciary Act also required that federal district court judges reside in the district for which they were appointed. The imposition of statutory qualifications and restrictions has continued unabated." 5 Being "learned in the law" was the first of many qualifications and restrictions related to professional status and credentials. For example, Congress has required appointees to be members of the bar of a federal court or a state's highest court," versed in Spanish and English," engineers," 8 persons with demonstrated knowledge in futures trading or commodities," and unconnected with a credit union." Citizenship, residency, and geographic qualifications have also been common. 8 ' Some statutes have also required that the President's nominees come from a particular branch or department of the government or from civilian life.3 Congress has also required that the President choose a nominee from a list provided by others such as Congress ' or industry and labor. M In addition, the President may not appoint a relative to an agency over which he exercises jurisdiction.'
Political party restrictions also limit the President's choice of nominees to numerous commissions, boards, and Article I courts. These bipartisanship requirements emerged in the 1880s alongside the creation of precursors to independent agencies. With the growth of the administrative state, the President is constrained in nominating officials of agencies that govern a broad range of activities." As noted above, however, the CIT is the only Article III court to have a political party diversity requirement. 89
C. Judicial Treatment of Restrictions
Considering the wide use of restrictions and qualifications of appointees, it is surprising how rarely courts have addressed the potential constitutional issues. Federal courts have issued few clear opinions on the requirements for appointment, and none has thoroughly analyzed the question. More specifically, the CIT's political party restriction has apparently never been raised in court. tion's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, which advised the Justice Department on nominees to the federal bench." The majority did not reach the constitutional questions raised by the participation of an advisory committee in the appointment process, 92 but Justice Kennedy argued that applying FACA's open meetings and public records requirements to the ABA panel would unconstitutionally interfere with the President's exclusive responsibility under the Appointments Clause by inhibiting his freedom to investigate and evaluate potential nominees. 9 Embracing a formalist viewpoint, Justice Kennedy first argued that the text of the Appointments Clause explicitly committed the nomination power to the President, and that "[n]o role whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in the process of choosing the person who will be nominated for appointment."' He then turned to the Federalist Papers as evidence that the framers intended Congress's only role in the appointment process to be the Senate's power to give or withhold its advice and consent. 9 Therefore, he concluded, any statutory expansion of that power must be unconstitutional.9
Despite this analysis, no court has ever invalidated a statutory restriction on appointments to federal office. Instead, a handful of courts have followed a functionalist approach advocated in one Supreme Court case that did not directly deal with the issue. Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion in Myers v United States" found Congress to have the authority to set qualifications for federal office under some conditions. Using its legislative power, Congress may establish offices, determine their functions and jurisdiction, fix their term and compensation, and prescribe "reasonable and relevant qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees." This test should allow courts to 91 Id at 443-47 (majority opinion). 92 Id at 443 (deciding the case on the grounds that FACA did not to apply to the ABA committee). A few other cases reflect Taft's functionalist view. Referring generally to Myers, Justice Stevens's concurrence in Bowsher v SynarU stated that "it is entirely proper for Congress to specify the qualifications for an office that it has created.' ' . 1 Taft's position also received support in United States v Espy,"" which held that "[a]lthough there are constitutional limits to the qualifications Congress can impose on presidential appointees, we have little doubt that Congress could legitimately restrict Agriculture Department officers to those not convicted under the Meat Inspection Act."' ' 3 A district court cited Myers's "reasonable and relevant" test in Mow Sun Wong v Hampton" for the proposition that Congress has the power to prescribe reasonable qualifications for at least inferior officers. 1 5 A variant on Justice Kennedy's view was put forward in Justice Brandeis's dissent in Myers. Brandeis agreed that the Constitution permits some restrictions on appointments, but he employed a different rationale. He noted that while "[t]here is not a word in the Constitution" that authorizes Congress to limit the President's range of nomination choices, Congress has enacted a "multitude of laws" that restrict his power to nominate, and every President has observed these laws.'"' "A persistent legislative practice which involves a delimitation of the respective powers of Congress and the President, and which has been so established and maintained, should be deemed tantamount to judicial construction, in the absence of any decision by any court to the contrary."' 0 ' In short, long and extensive use and acceptance of qualifications and restrictions gives them legitimacy. 2. Restrictions on political party affiliation.
Finally, the only two cases that directly addressed a political party restriction took a third approach and held the issue to be nonjusticiable. In FEC v NRA Political Victory Fund,"'8 the Federal Election Commission brought a civil enforcement action against the National Rifle Association's political action committee, which then challenged the constitutionality of the FEC on several separation of powers grounds.'09 One of those claims was that the statute's requirement that no more than three of six members of the FEC may be affiliated with the same political party impermissibly limited the President's nomination power under the Appointments Clause. " The court acknowledged that any such restrictions could raise constitutional questions, but found that it was "impossible to determine in this case whether the statute actually limited the President's appointment power.'"' The court first noted that Presidents have often viewed restrictions as not legally binding." 2 Second, the court argued that the need for bipartisanship on the politically charged FEC imposed such political restraints on the President that he would not alter the commission's balance even if he were not constrained by the statute." ' Invalidating the restriction thus would not necessarily redress the NRA's claimed injury."' The court did not specifically state that it was addressing the NRA's standing, but by raising redressability questions the court implicated standing doctrine. Standing appeared to be at issue when the court concluded that the issue might only be justiciable if the President appointed and the Senate confirmed a fourth same-party member, or if the President himself challenged the statute."' In a second case, the Ninth Circuit followed NRA Political Victory Fund's conclusion that the issue was nonjusticiable. " '
These holdings are open to significant criticisms. The argument that political restraints prevent the President from making unbalanced appointments is clearly undermined by the actual behavior when there is no statutory political party restriction. In those situations, Presidents rarely, if ever, make appointments on a strictly bipartisan basis." 7 To claim uncertainty about the effect of the statute on appointments to the commission is thus unrealistic."' In addition, these courts are confused about standing doctrine regarding constitutional challenges to administrative agencies."' Courts need not limit standing to a President who wants to appoint a fourth member from a single party to the FEC. A plaintiff only has to show that he has "sufficient concrete interests at stake" to maintain standing to raise separation of powers questions.' 20 The D.C. Circuit interpreted this to mean that litigants have such standing when they are "directly subject to the authority of the [challenged] agency."' 2 ' As the plaintiffs in both cases were directly subject to the FEC's authority, the courts should have granted standing."
Even if these two courts correctly held the FEC's political party restriction nonjusticiable, the cases cannot be generalized. The D.C. Circuit's argument about the need for bipartisanship on the politically charged FEC does not extend to agencies that do not regulate partisan political activity. In particular, it does not extend to an Article III court such as the CIT, which is insulated from political pressures.
Overall, the judicial record is too slim to draw any firm conclusions about the CIT's political party restriction. Furthermore, the few courts that have addressed restrictions generally have used different interpretive theories. An analysis of restrictions and qualifications 117 One need look no further than federal judicial appointments to reach this conclusion. See Gerald N. Rosenberg ne who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case is entitled to a decision on the merits of the question."). therefore must begin with first principles of constitutional construction.
III. RESTRICTIONS UNDER FORMALISM
Under a narrow formalist reading of the Appointments Clause, all statutory restrictions of any kind on the President's power to nominate are unconstitutional. This view derives from a formalist interpretation of the text and the structure of the Constitution, and accepted expressions of original intent. The Supreme Court's most extensive treatment of the question of restrictions reflects this perspective, and one could argue that a majority of the present Court is likely to adopt it." However, much of the formalist evidence is open to alternative interpretations, and a rigid application of the theory might require overturning dozens if not hundreds of laws." Nevertheless, an alternative but still formalist view of the evidence would not have such devastating consequences.
A. Text and Structure
Formalists use the Constitution's text and structure as the starting point for the argument that statutory restrictions on the President's power to nominate federal officers are impermissible. Formalists assert that the Appointments Clause is the only language in the text that provides for the appointment of officers and therefore consult no other provisions in deciding whether restrictions are valid.", Furthermore, the clear grammar and language of this exclusive allocation of power does not permit any interference with the President's power to select a nominee. The Constitution explicitly allocates the power to nominate to the President alone and limits the Senate to advice and consent on the appointment decision." Therefore, any attempt by Congress to limit the President's range of choices is unconstitutional.' 2 7 All restrictions and qualifications are thus invalid, including the CIT's political party diversity requirement. As noted above, this view of the text and structure is reflected in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Public Citizen.8 The fact that this interpretation would invalidate perhaps hundreds of organic statutes that include qualifications would not deter a formalist from adhering to the text."
The key formalist assertions about constitutional text and structure can be challenged on several fronts. First, the text may not be as exclusive as formalists claim. While the Appointments Clause grants the President control over the nomination and appointment of officers, other provisions grant Congress power over the offices it creates. This power may allow Congress to set qualifications for those offices. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to create offices in order to execute the laws it passes.' 30 A range of authorities has argued that this power likewise permits Congress to fix restrictions for those offices."' Two recent Supreme Court opinions that imposed not in the context of qualifications, but regarding direct appointment by Congress' 3 and appointment vested in a court of law. 1 ' 3
In short, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides a plausible though not conclusive alternative source of congressional power to set restrictions.
More particular to Article III courts, including the CIT, both Article I and Article III give Congress the power to create federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.' 35 This power is more specific than that granted in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and could be construed to grant Congress even wider authority to restrict access to the judicial offices it creates.' 36 Congress has the authority to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,' 3 7 which relates to the inferior courts it may "ordain and establish" from time to time. '3 8 First, these powers could be analyzed similarly to the Necessary and Proper Clause language. If so, however, the Appointments Clause limitations imposed by the Supreme Court could also be carried over to this language."' Second, a literal reading of the text could lead one to conclude that prohibited by the Constitution"); Amos T. Akerman, Opinion to the President on Civil-Service Commission, 13 Op Atty Gen 516, 520 (1871) (acknowledging that Congress has the power by direct legislation to prescribe qualifications for offices created by law). See also Note, 75 Mich L Rev at 641 (cited in note 130) (asserting that Congress should have the power under the Necessary and Proper clause to place limitations on the appointing authority's freedom of choice of nominees). Arguing that the ability to create an office gives Congress extensive power to stipulate qualifications, one commentator noted that it is "universally conceded that some choice, however small, must be left the appointing authority." Edward S. Corwin, the power to "ordain and establish" inferior courts broadly confers the ability to set qualifications. Finally, Congress's significant discretion to determine the jurisdiction of inferior courts might argue for a similar power to dictate their composition."o Like the Necessary and Proper Clause, these provisions offer another potential but equivocal textual basis for qualifications and restrictions. In addition, the language of the Appointments Clause itself could be construed more broadly than formalists construe it. On its face, the text is simply silent on whether limitations are permissible. This silence could be filled by Taft's "reasonable and relevant" test from Myers or by an inference from two centuries of statutory qualifications. The text of Article II does not explicitly stipulate that the President's range of choice must be infinite, so formalists are forced to turn to evidence of original intent to demonstrate the clarity of the text.14
B. Original Intent
When the text and structure of the Constitution fail to settle a separation of powers question, formalists often turn to the original intent of the framers.' 2 A variety of sources are commonly used as evidence of their intent. None of these sources offers conclusive proof of specific original intent regarding appointments restrictions, and some are contradictory. However, one reflection of original intentcontemporaneous legislative enactments that extend until the present-is both a powerful challenge to the rigid formalist textual claim that no restrictions are permitted and an avenue for supporting an alternative formalist view that some restrictions are acceptable but the CIT's political party restriction is not.
An examination of accepted original sources -the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the debates and actions of the First Congress -reveals significant concern about where the appointment power should be lodged. Some invoke this evidence in support of a constitutional bar on restrictions, but it is far from definitive. The background of the colonial period and the consequences of the Articles of Confederation strongly influenced the framers' views on the appointment power, particularly with respect to judges. 1 43 Under British law, the Crown held exclusive power to appoint judges and other officers.'" This led to an extensive system of patronage, particularly in the colonies, where the appointment of unqualified officers "was a constant source of exasperation and anxiety in American society. ' '14 The British further fanned the flames by refusing to extend life tenure and salary protection to judges.'46 Once the states achieved independence, they sharply limited executive involvement in judicial appointments. 14 However, this led to abuse by state legislators. The patronage problem simply shifted to the legislatures, where the potential for corruption and political intrigue was strong."8 Nevertheless, some members of the Constitutional Convention preferred legislative to executive appointment. 49 This conflict underscored the debate that followed.
The full history of the appointments debate is well-documented elsewhere,° but two elements are relevant to this Comment. First, it is clear that there was no consensus among the drafters about where the appointment power should lie. Two of the three plans formally introduced lodged the power in the legislature. " ' Debate over the issue spanned three months, with deep differences of opinion. The Convention soundly defeated a proposal that the President alone appoint judges,'z and the first vote on the proposal that the President nominate with the advice and consent of the Senate also did not garner a majority. " ' The Convention also defeated Madison's proposal that executive nominations become appointments unless a majority of the Senate disapproved." It appears that the sentiment during much of the Convention leaned toward appointment by the Senate. " 5 Nevertheless, the Convention in the end accepted without objection and with little debate the compromise that became the Appointments Clause. 6 Without much evidence, it is risky to construct the rationale behind this shift by the drafters. It is sufficient to acknowledge the genuine divisions among them about the location of the appointment power.
The second relevant element of the debates is the absence of specific intent regarding qualifications. One goal of the framers was to give the power to the branch that would appoint the most qualified officers. Several believed the executive best for this task, " while others favored the Senate's abilities. "8 On the other hand, Madison in particular believed legislatures unlikely to make good appointments. "9 Regardless of the framers' conflicting views on which branch would pick the most qualified candidate, they did not address the more specific question of whether the legislature could regulate any qualifications." Based on the framers' divergent views on the optimal locus of appointment power and the absence of specific intent regarding qualifi-cations, it is difficult to reach any conclusions from the debates of the Constitutional Convention.
The Federalist Papers offer strongly worded language that has been invoked to support a complete ban on restrictions and qualifications. 1 6 The most direct statement is Hamilton's argument that "[i]n the act of nomination, [the President's] judgment alone would be exercised ... his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment.' " If this reflects the genuine intent of the framers, it is fairly persuasive. A President exercising only his own judgment and being permitted to act as if he were making the appointment alone should not be constrained by legislative restrictions. On the other hand, the foregoing account of the Constitutional Convention leads to doubts about using Hamilton as an accurate barometer of original intent. 16 The acts and debates of the First Congress, which are often used to determine original understanding, also undermine the argument that the framers intended to bar all congressional restrictions and qualifications.'6 ' The First Congress established the first restrictions in the Judiciary Act of 1789, establishing residency requirements for federal district court judges and requiring that the Attorney General and District Attorneys be "a meet person learned in the law."' 65 These provisions limited the President's range of nominees, but there appears to have been no suggestion that they violated Article II.'"While this legislation is some evidence of original intent to permit qualifications for office, it may not be decisive. It is quite possible that the provision es- 166 Currie, The Constitution in Congress at 43 (cited in note 73). When the First Congress passed this qualification, there apparently was no suggestion that it violated the Appointments Clause. Id. However, a member of the House objected the following year to a provision of a bill that required the Superintendent of Indian Affairs to be a military officer, saying that the restriction unconstitutionally infringed on the power of the President. Another member responded that the President and the Senate were restricted in their appointments of officers in several departments, including the Attorney General. Nevertheless, the provision was removed from the bill, although potentially for policy, not constitutional, reasons. Id at n 255; 2 Annals of Congress 1522-23 (Gales and Seaton 1834).
caped the notice of members debating the many monumental issues in the bill or that its ramifications were not contemplated.
Nevertheless, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the other later statutory restrictions offer an alternative formalist conception of restrictions. As noted above, the Supreme Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that "contemporaneous legislative exposition" in which the framers actively participated "fixes the construction to be given its provisions," especially when that interpretation has been "acquiesced in for a long term of years."' 67 This argument is essentially the position Justice Brandeis took when he dissented in Myers.' The numerous qualifications imposed by Congress from the outset and the absence of significant objections therefore constitute weighty evidence in favor of finding at least some restraints on the President's appointment powers valid.' 6 '
C. An Alternative Formalist View A more refined formalist analysis treats some statutory qualifications as having stronger degrees of tradition and acquiescence and thus does not consider them equally valid under Article II. Formalism might therefore approve of some statutory restrictions but invalidate others. For the purposes of this Comment, the restrictions can be divided into two categories of tradition and acceptance.
The first category encompasses restrictions that can be traced to the framers and have been acquiesced in for many years. These include professional qualifications and residency requirements, which the First Congress imposed and successive Congresses have prescribed with little interruption or objection. 7 ' Citizenship requirements also have a strong history, with the first one imposed in 1802."'
The second category includes restrictions without the imprimatur of the framers and in which there has not been complete acquiescence. Political party restrictions, which did not appear until the creation of bodies that would later become independent agencies and have been challenged in court, fall into this category. restriction is an especially clear instance of a restriction in this category. It was not established until 1956, when Congress declared the CIT an Article III court, ' and the dispute in 1980 over whether to retain the provision may indicate an absence of strong acquiescence.' 74 Using this categorization, a formalist could validate the professional, residency, and citizenship requirements based on their long tradition. A formalist could also find all restrictions in the second category, including the CIT's political party restriction, in violation of the text of the Appointments Clause.
The CIT's political party restriction is thus likely to be found unconstitutional under formalism. The narrower version of formalism that only considers text, structure, and indicia of original intent is inconclusive. However, an alternative formalist model that accepts acts that the government has acquiesced to since the framing would classify the CIT's political party restriction as a violation of Article II's separation of powers.
IV. RESTRICTIONS UNDER FUNCTIONALISM
Instead of examining only the text and structure of the Constitution and original intent of the framers, functionalism considers the extent to which statutory restrictions encroach on the President's power to nominate and whether the policies underlying the restrictions justify this intrusion.' 5 The Supreme Court's only balancing test for statutory restrictions is Myers's language limiting them to "reasonable and relevant qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees.'.. Courts must evaluate these statutes on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are justified. Most restrictions will be found constitutional under this test, but the CIT's political party restriction fails it and thus violates the Appointments Clause.
The first step in the balancing test is to determine the extent of an encroachment on the President's constitutionally assigned power to nominate.'" Many statutory restrictions appear on their face to infringe significantly on the executive power. For example, professional qualifications-such as the requirement that members of the because in practice the President is not likely to want to nominate unqualified officers. Still, it can be argued that many statutory restrictions encroach on the President's constitutional power. The CIT's political party restriction likewise severely limits the President's range of choices. If the court already has five members from one political party, the statute will exclude from consideration the large percentage of the population from that party. Moreover, the President will almost always want to nominate a judge from his own political party, but the configuration of the court may force him under the statutory restriction to abandon those preferred choices. Even if the infringement on executive power is significant, it might still be justified by policy rationales of "reasonable and relevant qualifications." For most statutory restrictions, the policy rationales are reasonable and relevant. It is easy to understand why Congress would want the Solicitor General to be learned in the law and CFTC commissioners to be knowledgeable about commodities or futures trading. Citizenship and residency qualifications are equally justifiable.
However, the CIT's political party restriction cannot be justified as a reasonable and relevant qualification. The idea of an independent judiciary is one of the most powerful and enduring values of the separation of powers.' 79 The framers sought to ensure an independent judiciary by granting judges life tenure and preventing any diminution of their salaries. ' 8 The difficult task of impeachment was the only method permitted to remove federal judges."' The Supreme Court has repeatedly and vigorously defended judicial independence. For example, the Court declared in 1982: "our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of the United States' must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that independence. Statutory qualifications for judges on Article III courts such as the CIT impinge on their independence. Federal judges avoid identification with a particular party after they have been confirmed, regardless of the party of the nominating President.' Forcing them to admit their party affiliation therefore intrudes on their strict independence." Forced association with a party may undermine public confidence in their impartiality.' Formally designating judges as members of a particular political party may leave the impression that the judge is biased toward members of his or her party. 6 Statutory qualifications also could influence judicial decisionmaking if judges feel that their nominations depended on an explicit quid pro quo obligating them to rule in favor of their party.
The policy arguments favoring political party qualifications for Article III judges fail to outweigh the infringement on judicial independence. During the debates over the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 188 See Patricia M. Wald, Last Thoughts, 99 Colum L Rev 270, 271-72 (1999) (noting in response to a proposal that appellate panels be required to be politically diverse that "the Constitution provides its own device for diversity over the long haul through the nomination and confirmation of federal judges by the political branches").
Second, the supporters argued that since the CIT makes international economic policy, it should represent a cross section of the "American body politic. 1 8 9 This is akin to the original justification for political diversity on the Board of General Appraisers, which was to maintain a balance between members with a high tariff philosophy and those with a low tariff philosophy.'9'This argument lacks a limiting principle and could thus be extended to the entire federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, which also rules on trade issues. In addition, this rationale incorrectly assumes that party affiliation is an accurate proxy for views on issues likely to be before the CIT. In fact, both Democrats and Republicans have free trade and isolationist wings, making the political party restriction a poor way for Congress to achieve this diversity objective. Finally, this argument ignores the duty of impartiality expected of federal judges,' which the framers sought in part to guarantee through the Article III protections.'9 Judges should therefore make decisions based on the facts and law of cases, not on some role as a representative of a segment of the American body politic.
While a political party restriction on an Article III court is not justified under a functionalist approach, similar restrictions on administrative agencies and Article I courts present a more difficult question. If members of administrative bodies such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission exercised only executive powers, political party restrictions would be inappropriate. The vesting clause of Article II grants the President the power to select appointees who will carry out his policies.' 93 However, administrative agencies and Article I courts also exercise powers similar to Congress and federal courts, which could justify the use of political party restrictions.
Political party restrictions may be justified as a way to increase the accountability of administrative agency officials.'9 Members of Congress are directly accountable to voters, who may defeat them at the polls in a subsequent election. Agency administrators who promulgate binding regulations are not nearly as accountable. They might therefore approve rules without regard to the public interest. Moreover, they may issue regulations with a bias toward the interests of the President, due to his relatively unfettered power to remove them for good cause. 9 ' Political party restrictions may therefore be "reasonable and relevant" for administrative agency officials. Political party restrictions also may limit the bias of administrative bodies acting as court-like adjudicators. Agency adjudicators might skew their decisions in favor of a President who has some removal power. Political party restrictions would force the President to appoint politically diverse administrative agency officers, and could be justified as an attempt to make the agencies less likely to be biased." 6 In short, political party restrictions can thus be justified as a way to prevent the President from turning quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial bodies into partisan units that deny justice and benefits to members of other parties. CONCLUSION The Court of International Trade's unique political party restriction violates the Appointments Clause under either a formalist or functionalist separation of powers theory. A narrow formalist view that only considers the text and structure of the Constitution does not sufficiently address the issues raised by statutory restrictions, as the text and structure are neither clear nor exclusive. A formalist interpretation would also lead to the invalidation of hundreds of restrictions and qualifications of various offices. A broader formalist view that encompasses legislative enactments that reflect the intent of the framers is more forceful. Certain restrictions reflect the original intent and are valid, while those without the framers' imprimatur-including the political party diversity requirement of the CIT-are not. This strain of formalism also does not lead to the invalidation of so many statutory provisions.
195 See Marshall J. Breger and Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin L Rev 1111, 1144-46 (2000) (noting that many commentators believe there to be a wide variety of reasons for which independent agency officials may be removed "for cause"). 196 On the other hand, agency adjudicators are likely to be the most shielded by "for cause" restrictions, so political party restrictions may be less needed. See Dellinger, The Constitutional Separation of Powers, 1996 OLC LEXIS 6 at *148-49 (cited in note 127) (arguing that "for cause and fixed term limitations on the power to remove officers with adjudicatory duties affecting the rights of private individuals will continue to meet with consistent judicial approval").
